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Philosophy Colloquium: Ross Cameron, University of Virginia
(Academic)
How do we determine the ontological commitments of a theory? Quine says: Regiment the theory in a first-order language and then see what the quantifiers must range over in order for the theory to be true. This is the orthodox answer. Quine also said that second-order logic is set theory in sheep's clothing, and that there is no fact of the matter as to what exists independently of our conceptual scheme. These claims are not orthodoxy. I will argue that the metaphysically realist Quinean view that has become dominant is not stable: if we admit the legitimacy of second order logic and think that thtere is an objective fact of the matter as to what exists, we must abandon the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In its place I propose an alternative account of ontological commitment that is unapologetically metaphysical.
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